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Introduction
1 Compared to the railroad and fluvial networks, road infrastructure remains a blank
spot  in  the  historiography of  colonial  planning in  Congo,  and by  extension,  in  the
entire continent. Nonetheless, the colonial road network was used to efficiently carry
out  the  health  care  program,  tax  system,  postal  service,  and  the  military  control
system,  which  Freed  called  the  ‘networks  of  colonial  power’  (Freed,  2010).  From a
diffusionist  standpoint  that  polarises  ‘Western’  and  ‘indigenous’  technologies,  one
could hypothesise that road infrastructure thus equally served as a tool of empire during
the Belgian colonisation (Headrick, 1981). However, the analysis of the interwar road
construction in the Bas-Congo region leads us to question this concept of tool of empire,
striving  for  ‘a  more  interactive,  culturally-nuanced,  multi-sited  debate  about  how
technology functions within specific parameters of time, place and culture’ (Arnold,
2005). 
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2 As road construction implies access to land,  recruitment of  labour,  and a means of
extraction of goods, the road network in the colonial context is inevitably linked to
ideas  of  power,  culture  and identity.  Road construction in  Belgian Congo was  thus
closely related to the development of missionary congregations (Cleys et al., 2019; Cleys,
De  Meulder,  2011),  investment  strategies  of  private  capital,  politics  of  the  colonial
government administration, and various levels of African agency. In line with David
Peleman’s Les Hommes de la Route for Belgium (Peleman, 2013), the overall goal of this
research is to unveil who were some of the main actors involved in the design and
production of the colonial road network, and what were their agendas. Focussing on
the evolution of the road network built in Belgian Congo during the interwar period,
this article studies two of these specific actors: the colonial government and private
entrepreneurs. In particular, the analysis of the case of interwar road construction in
the Cataractes-Nord region illustrates how private entrepreneurs deployed the colonial
government’s  road  policies  in  their  favour  by  carefully  responding  to  governance
sensitivities in order to access the colonial hinterland. Contrary to the still dominant
discourse  on  the  history  of  colonial  planning  (Scott,  1998;  Young,  1994),  the  case
illustrates as such how everyday colonial policymaking in Belgian Congo was deeply
reliant  on  the  capabilities  and  motives  of  government  officials  and  private
entrepreneurs ‘on the ground’.
3 Existing studies on transportation in Congo, including those dating from the 1950s and
60s,  have been limited almost  exclusively  to  fluvial  navigation,  the development of
airlines and, most importantly, the railway network (Blanchart, 1993; Katzellenbogen,
1973; Lederer,  1965; Vanthemsche, 2001).  In more general surveys of transportation
networks in (colonial) Congo, the discussions on road infrastructure remain extremely
concise (Headrick, 1981; Huybrechts, 1970; Nicolaï, 1996; Sabakinu Kivilu, 1979). Besides
a  noteworthy  study  on  the  development  of  motor  vehicles  in  Belgian  Congo
(Tsund’olela,  1987),  it  is quite telling that the most informative source on the topic
remains a technical report of 218 pages written by Egide-Jean Devroey, an engineer
employed in the Ministry of Colonies (Devroey, 1939). This lack of research on road
infrastructure is not specific to the Belgian colony, but can be extended to other studies
on transportation in colonial Africa (Dix, 1931). One of the few scholars who did engage
in  studies  on  mobility  in  colonial  and  postcolonial  Africa,  Gordon  Pirie,  writes:
‘compared to the railway, the road and its users have been something of a Cinderella in
African transportation history’ (Pirie, 1990, 2009, 2018). 
4 Anno 2020, some scholars try to put research on colonial infrastructure back on the
table (Cupers, 2018; Scotto 2018), although the study of road networks and car mobility
in colonial  Africa still  remains in the margins (Gewald,  2002,  2009).  Still,  upcoming
scholars convincingly argue that road infrastructure and the car mobility it enabled,
provide a powerful lens to rethink colonial history by presenting ‘alternative visions of
space and power, autonomy and authority,  mobility and control’  (Hart,  2015,  2016).
Nancy Rose Hunt provided a  similar  cultural  perspective on the history of  colonial
mobility, studying the disruptive nature of new forms of mobility on African societies,
and the struggles related to the simultaneous events of rural health care and forced
road construction (Hunt, 1999). Furthermore, Freed’s Networks of (colonial) power: roads
in  French  Central  Africa  after  World  War  I,  studies  roads  and  road  work  as  ‘sites  of
contestation  over  colonial  rule  and  order’,  signalling  the  disruptive  impact  of  the
forced and technically simple road work on local populations (Freed, 2010). At the same
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time, recent contributions to the emerging field of the anthropology of infrastructure
discuss how road infrastructure does more than only connect,  it  participates in the
creation and recreation of social spaces (Rest, Rippa, 2019).
5 In  Belgian  Congo,  the  construction  of  a  fine-grained  road  network  coincides  not
unsurprisingly  with the emergence of  a  colonial  bureaucratic  apparatus  during the
interwar  years.  This  period  in  Congo’s  history  has  not  received  much  scholarly
attention until recent years (Petit, Vanderlinden, 2016; Vanderlinden, 2019). Contrarily
to  railroads that  played  a  major  role  in  linking  emerging  cities  and  thus  helped
structure the urbanisation of the colony, the road network in colonial Congo was more
closely  linked  with  the  development  of  the  countryside  and  the  upcoming  rural
economy, a strategy that attracted new political interest after WWI. The rural economy
of  Belgian  Congo  has  been  overlooked  for  the  major  part  in  recent scholarship
(Drachoussoff,  1991;  Jewsiewicki,  1980,  1983)  as  most  scholars  tend to  focus  on the
urban  centres,  although  some  noticeable  exceptions  can  be  found  (Clement,  2007;
Segers, 2016). 
6 Looking  at  the  often  messy  colonial  reality  in  this  ‘periphery  of  the  periphery’
(Sengupta, 2010) allows us to investigate how centrally planned, top-down road policies
were effectively implemented ‘on the ground’. Starting from a detailed analysis of the
interwar context of colonial road policies, this article elaborates on how the Belgian
government  considered  the  road  network  an  essential  component  of  the  armature
économique and wanted to stimulate its construction to efficiently access the colonial
hinterland.  Road  infrastructure  served  as  a  means  of  control  for  Belgian  colonial
officials, via which they could penetrate this rural territory for medical, military, or
administrative motives. A substantial part of the road infrastructure network provided
the  framework  for  the  development  of  car-based  tourism,  which  targeted  both  an
‘internal’  and an ‘external’  market from the 1930s onwards (Verhoeven, Payrhuber,
2019).  Subsequently,  the  eighty-year-old  technical  report  on  road  infrastructure
written by Egide-Jean Devroey, an engineer employed in the Ministry of Colonies, is
used to deconstruct the colonial administration’s vision of a rational categorization and
implementation of roads in the colonial territory (Devroey, 1939). 
7 In the second part of this article, we contrast these government strategies with a close
reading of the case of Victor Cooreman, a jute planter who wanted to install himself in
the Cataractes-Nord region in 1928. After three years of correspondence between the
entrepreneur and the various levels of government agents, Victor Cooreman ultimately
convinced the Belgian government to  finance a  road crucial  for  the entrepreneur’s
activities,  and  to  recruit  indigenous  labourers  for  the  road’s  construction  and
maintenance. The detailed description of the case reveals the aptitude and agency of
both a variety of government officials and private entrepreneurs, as well as the messy
reality of how these policies landed and adapted ‘on the ground’. At the same time, the
internal  correspondence  within  the  government  administration  demonstrates  the
relatively  of  this  colonial  road  infrastructure  as  tools  of  empire, as  these  centrally-
planned roads became ‘tools’ local actors used for their own intentions, in a complex
web of knowledge and technology exchanges and interconnectedness (Arnold, 2005). 
8 This  article  mainly  builds  upon  research  done  in  the  Africa  Archives,  which  are
currently  kept  within  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Brussels.  Their  collections
predominantly  contain  records  from  the  former  Ministry  of  Colonies  as  well  as  a
substantial  part  of  the  archives  of  the  Gouvernement  Général  (GG),  the  central
Governing economic interests: Interwar road construction in Belgian Congo
Belgeo, 1 | 2020
3
administration in Léopoldville. The majority of documents consulted were – internal
and external  –  correspondence  from both  government  apparatuses,  combined with
various  maps  produced  by  both  the  colonial  government  and  by  private  colonial
entrepreneurs. Drawing upon recent ideas in colonial historiography about the close-
reading of colonial archives (Allman, 2013; Stoler, 2009), this study is based on imperial
sources  in  the  context  of  the  Master’s  dissertation of  the  author1,  so  native  voices
remain out of reach. Nevertheless, their agency can be partially highlighted through a
detailed  study of  the  strategies  implemented by  the  colonial  state  to  achieve  their
goals, be they profit maximisation or territorial control (Henriet, 2015). 
9 By analysing the case of Victor Cooreman’s road negotiation in the Cataractes-Nord
region, we hope to provide useful insights in the nuanced realities of colonial  road
construction in order to add to the rising scholarship on localised agencies (Salami,
2016; De Nys-Ketels et al., 2019). At the same time, this case offers a powerful tool to
critically  reassess  African  transportation  and  planning  history,  which  seems  quite
technical at first, but ultimately proves to be exceptionally layered.
 
Road infrastructure as part of the colonial Armature
économique 
10 At the end of the 19th century, the road network in Belgian Congo was mainly limited to
the Bas-Congo region, trying to secure the narrow carrier routes installed by Henry
Morton Stanley in 1886 (Fig. 1, right-hand side). Even in the broader context of the
African  continent,  only  in  the  interwar  years  the  first  steps  towards  national  and
international  colonial  road  networks  were  taken.  In  Belgian  Congo,  the  launch  of
Minister  of  Colonies  Louis  Franck’s  investment  plan  in  1922  accelerated  the
development  of  different  means  of  (cheap)  transportation  infrastructure  (Vanhove,
1968). Louis Franck (1868-1937) was the liberal Minister of Colonies of Belgium between
1918  and  1924.  He  launched  the  so-called  ‘Plan  Franck’  on  August  21,  1921,  which
consisted of a series of laws and regulations responding to the need for transportation
infrastructure in order to stimulate private investment (Belgian Colonial Biography).
11 A second mayor element of the ‘Plan Franck’ was the decentralisation of the Belgian
Ministry of Colonies by erecting seven Departments – or Directions Générales –, such as a
department  of  Agriculture  and  one  of  Public  Works.  Since  1908,  the  Ministry  of
Colonies had ruled over Belgian Congo from Brussels,  combining the legislative and
executive  power.  A  parallel,  similarly  organised  administration  operated  in
Léopoldville2 (now  Kinshasa)  in  Belgian  Congo,  called  the  General  Government  or
Gouvernement Général. Led by the Gouverneur Général (Governor General), this apparatus
encompassed several similar administrative branches, including a Léopoldville-based
Public  Works  service.  Additionally,  the  Gouvernement  Général supervised
subdepartments  based  in  each  of  the  four  provincial  capitals,  which  were  named
Gouvernements  Provinciaux and  led  by  Vice-Governors  or  Gouveneurs  des  Provinces
(Vanhove, 1968; Vellut et al., 1996). Each of these Provinces was in turn divided into
districts  and  territoires,  the  former  led  by  a  Commissaire  de  District.  This  complex
machinery of the overseas government was limited to enacting specific or urgent laws
set forth by the Brussels-based Belgian government. From their creation in 1908, both
government  apparatuses  struggled  with  this  parallel  structure,  and  especially  the
government in Léopoldville was frustrated by its lack of legislative power. Informal
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dissent grew between the Brussels and Léopoldville government officials during the
interwar period, and even within the different levels of the colonial government, the
lower  based  officials  argued  for  more  decentralization.  Moreover,  struggles  arose
between  the  lowest  ranks  of  the  white  colonial  administrators  on  the  field,  the
Administrateurs Territoriaux, and the various levels of African power who were appointed
by the colonial authorities, such as the customary chiefs who often retained a degree of
authority over local village populations (Vellut et al., 1996). 
12 In  addition to  its  economic and political  narrative,  the ‘Plan Franck’  represented a
preliminary step in the Belgian governments’ strategy of rationalising the organization
of  indigenous  labour  force.  After  the  international  critique  on  the  forced  labour
practices  and  the  way  the  Congo  Free  State  was  ruled  before  1908,  the  Belgian
government strove to project the image of a model colony to the world. From the 1920s
onwards, representatives of Belgium took an active role in the composition of various
international  anti-slavery  conventions  in  the  newly  established  League  of  Nations.
These covenants were of various effectiveness,  as national governments interpreted
them depending their own definition of the term ‘forced labour’ (Laqua, 2013). Note
how particularly the Portuguese and Belgian governments argued during the 1920s that
‘labour  could  be  made  compulsory  not  only  for  public  works  but  for  purposes  of
education and social welfare’. Although never officially against these conventions, the
Belgian government postponed the ratification of the 1930s ‘Forced Labour Convention’
for over a decade, only wanting to accept the convention provided that it allowed for
‘works of public interest, as determined by competent authorities’ (Laqua, 2013). This
clearly  illustrates  the  Belgian  government’s  conflicting  motives  concerning  forced
labour that  benefitted the development of  their  colonie  modèle or  labour defined as
‘educating the passive and lazy indigenous population’ as part of a civilizing mission
(Laqua,  2013).  After  WWII,  these  impromptu  strategies  accumulated  in  a  shift  of
colonial  policymaking towards  what  Young has  called  ‘welfare  colonialism’  (Young,
1994), where the colonial extraction economy was reframed by associating it to major
housing, healthcare and education investments (De Nys-Ketels et al., 2019).
13 Between 1927 and 1931, catholic politician Henri Jaspar (1870-1939) was almost without
interruption both Prime Minister of Belgium and Minister of Colonies (Vanhove, 1958).
Well aware of the rising international tensions, he wanted to reconcile the progress of
Congolese industries with the possibilities and limitations of the local labour force. To
this end, Jaspar had an in-depth investigation carried out in 1930 in Belgian Congo,
which resulted in the publication of Expansion coloniale: étude documentaire sur l’armature
économique de la colonie belge du Congo. This two-volume publication consisted of set
of essays about the armatures that frame the economic expansion of the colony, such as
agriculture,  education,  geology,  legislation  and  transportation  networks  (Jaspar,
Passelecq, 1932). Jaspar continued the politics of his predecessors in the creation of
new railways and road networks, and the development of stations and ports, explicitly
considering the road network an essential part of the armature économique.  Based on
this  detailed  survey,  Jaspar  established  new  recruitment  standards  in  the  various
economic  zones,  arguing that  this  would  lower  the  pressure  on  the  indigenous
population (Vanhove, 1968).
14 Although the road policies discussed in the ‘Plan Franck’ and Henri Jaspar’s Expansion
coloniale indirectly  conceived road infrastructure as  a  tool  of  empire,  they divulged
little  on  how  the  Belgian  government  envisioned  the  implementation  of  their
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(inter)national  transportation  and  labour  politics  ‘on  the  ground’.  Remarkably,  the
eighty-year-old Le Réseau Routier au Congo Belge et au Ruandi-Urundi (Devroey, 1939) is a
key source to study the perception of colonial road policies in the Léopoldville-based
colonial administration, as it remains the most complete source on the Belgian colonial
road  network  until  today.  This  technical  report  was  written  in  1939  by  Egide-Jean
Devroey (1894-1972), a prominent engineer employed by the Ministry of Colonies in
Léopoldville (Belgian Colonial Biography), and reads as an accumulation of Devroey’s
two decades of experiences and frustrations with the ad hoc road construction policies
in  Belgian  Congo  (Fig.  1,  left-hand  side).  Trying  to  respond  to  the  struggles  of
implementing centrally-decided road policies in an extensive colonial territory over
eighty times the size of Belgium, Devroey wrote an all-inclusive guide for the colonial
government apparatus in order to offer each administrator, regardless of his rank in
the colonial hierarchy, a set of objective criteria to guide the construction of a road in a
rational and objective manner.
15 In the first part of the publication, Devroey distinguished between private and public
roads,  and divided the latter into three administrative categories.  The primary and
secondary public roads linked the rural economy with the supra-local rail and river
networks, and were used for economic transportation of exploited goods. Additionally,
the author discussed a third category: the routes pour voyageurs. These roads served
no economic purpose, but offered administrative, political and tourist accessibility of
the territory. They were a tool of control for Belgian colonial officials, via which they
could penetrate this  rural  territory for medical,  military or administrative motives.
These routes pour voyageurs were used by bicycling nurses and linked the African rural
population with the local missionary church. 
16 Devroey further made a distinction between roads of intérêt général (‘general interest’)
and of intérêt local (‘local interest’). Roads of ‘general interest’ were defined as public
roads that connected administrative centres of the colony, and were the only roads
that could be financed by the Belgian state. Any public road that was not granted this
status of intérêt général by the Gouverneur Général, automatically became a road of intérêt 
local. This seemingly practical set of guidelines was created to automatise an efficient
access  of  the  entire  colonial  territory,  additionally  prioritizing  the  construction  of
major roads that stimulated government control and economic expansion. 
17 However,  the  analysis  of  interwar  road  construction  in  the  Cataractes-Nord  region
discussed below will illustrate how this status of intérêt général was (mis)used both by
private  entrepreneurs  and  the  various  government  officials  to  motivate  their  own
agendas. A close reading of the correspondence between various government officials
and  Victor  Cooreman,  a  private  entrepreneur  who  wanted  to  establish  his  jute
plantation in the region, offers new insights in the dissonant decision-making process
of  colonial  road  construction.  Studying  the  genesis  of  the  road  between Luozi  and
M’bedi, the first road in the Cataractes-Nord territoire and the road Cooreman needed
to access his plantation, reveals how the colonial road policies landed and were adapted
‘on the ground’ in this ‘periphery of the periphery’. 
 
Governing economic interests: Interwar road construction in Belgian Congo
Belgeo, 1 | 2020
6
Figure 1. Left-hand side: Construction d’une route en forêt primaire. Route Mombasa-Avakubi,
1930. Right-hand side: La route des caravans. 
Devroey, 1939, p. 42; p. 16 (copyright requested by author)
 
Jute economy as incentive for colonial road
construction: the case of Victor Cooreman
Jute plantation in the Luala basin
18 Victor  Cooreman et  Cie was established on February 1,  1923 with the purpose of  ‘the
trade, import and export of cotton and jute fabrics, the manufacture of these fabrics, as
well  as  all  operations  related  to  this  trade’(Statute  Books  Belgium).  Its  main
shareholder  was  Victor  Cooreman  (1879-1976),  the  son  of  catholic  politician  and
businessman Gérard Cooreman (1852-1926),  both members of  a  family active in the
fibre  industry  and  part  of  the  bourgeois  upper  class  of  the  city  of  Ghent.  Gérard
Cooreman was the founder and president of the ‘Compagnie Cotonnière Congolaise’
(COTONCO)  since  1920  (Statute  Books  Belgium),  and  his  son  wanted  to  expand  his
professional activities in the colony by installing a jute plantation in the Luala basin.
19 This  basic  was  defined as  a  triangular  zone between the  villages  Luala,  Dende and
Kingila, and located in the remote Cataractes-Nord territory in the Bas-Congo region.
Inaccessible  by  road  or  railroad  infrastructure,  Cooreman  feared  that  the  existing
porterage route from Luala to Luozi would considerably delay the transportation of
their  jute  harvest  to  Europe,  so  a  road needed to  be  constructed to  optimise  their
transportation process. Figure 2 illustrates the route the jute harvest took from the
exploitation site to Europe (Fig. 2). Starting from the Luala basin (the red triangle), the
harvest was transported by indigenous carriers to Luozi: a route of about 60 kilometres,
depicted in a red dashed line on the map. Once arrived in Luozi, the jute got loaded
upon canoes, which followed the river downstream to Kinganga. As the river became
unnavigable shortly after Kinganga, the harvest was loaded upon trucks in this harbor
and transported to Lufu, 55 kilometers southwards3. This road between Kinganga and
Lufu was built by Gérard Cooreman at the beginning of the century to help transport
his goods. In the city of Lufu, the Cooreman company had already established a trading
post,  where their  goods arriving from Kinganga were reloaded.  There,  the produce
boarded a train and was transported to the port city of Matadi via the Léopoldville-
Matadi railroad.
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Figure 2. Route of the jute from the Luala basin to Europe, 1928. 
Cartography made by author4 
20 When  asked  to  specify  the  region  where  Victor  Cooreman  wanted  to  establish  his
exploitation site, the firm hired aristocrat Charles d’Yve(s) de Bavay (1885-1982)5 who
was considered an agricultural  expert  with experience in  the Dutch Indies  (Laplae,
1926). He was tasked to travel to the Luala basin and investigate the possibilities of jute
cultivation in the region. Besides describing the production process and the quality of
the soil of the Luala basin, the agriculturist stated explicitly that a road needed to be
constructed to efficiently access the exploitation site. In his analysis, he included a map
on which he drew the demarcation the ‘Luala basin’, as well as the trajectory of the
proposed road (Fig. 3). The map depicted various rivers and their affluents, as well as
the mission posts present in the region (both Catholic and Protestant). Moreover, the
indigenous  villages  and  sentiers  indigènes that  connected  them were  visualised.  The
representation  of  these  indigenous  pathways  is  quite  remarkable,  as  these  sentiers
indigènes were  usually  left  out  on  government-drawn  maps.  d’Yves  de  Bavay
furthermore distinguished between local villages and chefferies, the latter signifying a
village with a type of higher administrative power. A single dashed line showed the
trajectory of the road connecting the envisioned exploitation site to the port of Luozi,
of which d’Yves de Bavay quoted in the corresponding letter: ‘le tracé de cette route
constitue un secteur d’une voie dont la construction est, paraît-il, prévue au budget’6.
This  new road  was  seen  as  a  continuation  of  a  route  planned by  the  government,
however,  our  research  did  not  find  any  sources  in  the  government’s  archives  to
confirm this argument. 
21 Analysing this map as an archival document in its own right, reveals how this region,
and the colony in general, was not at all the ‘terra nullius’ the colonial government
depicted in  their  cartographic  vision for  the  colony.  The presence  of  these  sentiers
indigènes represent one of the existing logics present in this rural countryside, which
usually  remained  hidden  in  the  colonial  government’s  official  correspondence  and
mapping  on  the  region.  Moreover,  considering  these  private  entrepreneurs  as
cartographic  explorers  opens up opportunities  to  investigate  and reassess  the local
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realities  of  road  construction,  and  by  extension,  the  historiography  of  colonial
planning. 
 
Figure 3. Luala basin.
Africa Archives 3DG 1621 N° 4250, December 7, 1929
 
From private road to route d’intérêt général
22 As  the  projected  road  between  the  Luala  basin  and  Luozi  only  benefitted  the
exploitation of Victor Cooreman, officially, it should have been categorised as a private
road, and thus commissioned and maintained by the entrepreneur himself. However,
both  the  applicant’s  eloquent  wording  and  the  internal  dissonance  within  the
government apparatus allowed that the road was ultimately paid and maintained by
the Belgian government,  and even received the status of  ‘general  interest’.  Digging
deeper in the correspondence between the jute planter and the colonial government
discloses the complex history of road construction in this ‘periphery of the periphery’.
Furthermore, the intricate set of actors involved in the genesis of this road reveals a
complex  web  of  exchanges  and  interconnectedness  between  them,  and  questions
colonial roads as tool of empire. 
23 On June 28, 1928, Victor Cooreman demanded a concession for exploiting a fibre of the
jute  family  in  the  Luozi  region  in  the  Bas-Congo.  He  requested  a  trial  area  of  100
hectares, under the condition of expanding later on if the experiment proved to be
successful.  The  region  the  firm  had  set  its  minds  on  was  bordered  by  the  rivers
Luhumbo, Luala and Lukasu, all affluents of the Congo River. The Luala basin, as they
called it, was located 45 kilometres north-east of Luozi, in the triangular zone between
villages Luala, Dende and Kingila7 (Fig. 3). 
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24 The Minister of Colonies, Henri Jaspar, answered one month later that it was impossible
to permit a trial area of such a size at the given time, seeing as the economic and social
conditions of the Bas-Congo district did not allow extra industries8. As discussed above,
the Belgian government refused to officially restrict the forced labour recruitment for
‘public interest’ throughout the interwar period. Jaspar thus most likely referred to the
shortage of local workforce in the district, due to the mandatory recruitment of the
indigenous population for construction of the Matadi-Léopoldville railroad in the Bas-
Congo (Charlier, 2019). Moreover, the Luala basin was known for its low population
density, due to the sleeping disease epidemics that plagued the region, amongst other
reasons (Nicolaï,  1961).  The forced recruitment and inhumane circumstances during
the  nine  years  of  railroad  construction  for  Matadi-Léopoldville  railroad  region
(1923-1932) led to a widespread fear of the indigenous population for state recruiters, a
topic  which  has  been  studied  in  a  painstakingly  detailed  way  (Marchal,  2000).
Henceforth,  the  majority  of  the  local  population  sought  employment  in  other
industries, resulting in the migration of young men to the mines of Congo-Brazzaville,
as well as to other exploitation sites in neighbouring districts9. The colonial state tried
to  limit  these  forms  of  indigenous  nomadism,  wanting  to  contain  the  Congolese
population  within  their  territoires to  control  the  pool  of  indigenous  labour  force
(Henriet, 2015; Mathys, 2014). The letter finished with Minister Jaspar’s suggestion that
Cooreman  should  focus  on  developing  a  way  to  use  more  mechanical  means  of
exploiting  the  area,  signifying  that  an  industrial  culture  with  mechanical
transportation would be easier to consider because it would put less pressure on the
scarcely  available  local  workforce.  Furthermore,  the  mechanical  transportation
methods would suppress part of the porterage service that additionally strained the
indigenous  population.  As  the  Cataractes-Nord  territory  had  no transportation
infrastructure to that date (see also Fig. 2), its location in the Bas-Congo district – the
bottleneck for exported goods from the hinterland to Matadi – led to a major flux of
goods between Léopoldville and Matadi, of which big parts had to be carried by the
indigenous  population  (Fig.  1,  right-hand  side;  Fontainas,  1921).  Existing  studies
explain how the arrival of road transportation was welcomed by most of the native
population in Belgian Congo, as jobs in porterage service were considered denigrating,
and often carriers deserted their posts due to the harsh conditions (Samarin,  1985;
Vansina, 2010; Wauters, 1924)10. 
25 Cooreman wrote back several months later, on the October 5, 1928, with a renewed
request for a trial area, along with the more demanding condition of reserving as much
as 10,000 hectares for future exploitation. The company gave several reasons as to why
the  new  concession  would  not  put  excessive  pressure  on  the  available  indigenous
workforce :  ‘Nous  vous  donnons  l’assurance  que,  pour  la  mise  en  valeur  de  nos
concessions, nous aurions recours au machinisme et aux transportations mécaniques,
dans toute la mesure de nos moyens […] La nature même de notre entreprise nous y
obligerait  indépendamment  de  notre  désir  de  nous  conformer  à  la  politique  du
Gouvernement’11. More remarkable is how the author literally quoted that they would
not start the recruitment of labourers before the railroad works are completed. This
illustrates  how  Cooreman  was  well  aware  of  the  problem  concerning  labour
recruitment  for  railroad  construction,  and  realised  that  they should  not  present
themselves  as  competition  for  the  government  in  terms  of  recruiting  the  local
workforce. On December 3, 1928, the Gouverneur Général gave his ‘principle agreement’
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to a concession of 100 hectares with the goal of establishing further exploitation of jute
cultivation in the region, if the experiment proved to be successful.
26 In  his  following  letter,  the  entrepreneur  did  no  longer  mention  the  government’s
recruitment  for  the  railroad  construction,  but  demanded  that  no  other  European
enterprises  will  be  allowed  to  occupy  other  parts  of  the  region  and  approach  its
workforce. More precisely, Cooreman & Co. requested aid in constructing the needed
roads  to  access  the  new  concession,  as  far  as  they  were  public  roads  of  ‘general
interest’, ‘Pour ce qui est de la construction des routes, nous espérons que la colonie
consentirait à nous donner l’aide nécessaire pour leur exécution et à intervenir dans la
dépense pour autant qu’elles soient d’intérêt général’12. Later that month, the Minister
of Colonies gave his agreement on the extension, but asked the firm to specify the
requested area as well as the demanded conditions. On December 2, 1929, the company
specified their demand for a specific protection zone, and the government’s help in
recruiting workforce for the construction of the road from Luala to Luozi, using the
map  drawn  by  their  representative  in  the  territory, d’Yves  de  Bavay  (Fig.  3).  The
emphasis of the request was no longer on financial assistance but on recruitment aid,
as the firm was well aware it would be nearly impossible to prove that the road was a
public road of ‘general interest’. Recruiting local workforce at the same conditions as
the government would not  only result  in financial  profit  for  the company (as  they
would  pay  lower  wages),  it  would  also  offer  a  better  guarantee  of  workforce.  As
discussed before, the district struggled with shortage of local African labour force, and
by  granting  the  firm  an  official  permit  to  recruit  in  a  similar  manner  to  the
government,  Cooreman  &  Co.  could  have  a  bigger  authority  vis-à-vis  the  local
workforce as well  as  the government recruiters,  who were competing for the same
scarce labourers. This request was entirely conflicting, as the discussed road would of
course only serve the company, therefore it would have to be categorised officially as a
private road, allowing it no governmental aid at all. 
27 Dissonant reactions were given to this demand by the various levels of governmental
authority in the colony, from the local Administrateur Territorial, to the Commissaire de
District,  the  Gouverneur  de  Province,  and  ultimately  the  Gouverneur  Général based  in
Léopoldville. The Agronome Provincial – the provincial agricultural administrator –, M.
Peters, and the Administrateur Territorial of the Cataractes-Nord territory, M. Lecocq,
both agreed to Cooreman’s demands, arguing how the need for added revenues and
decline  of  porterage  service  dominated  when  granting  this  protection  zone  in  the
region.  Lecocq  explained  how  the  jute  harvest  of  the  trial  area  needed  to  be
transported via Luozi-Kinganga-Lufu (Fig. 2), of which only the part between Luala and
Luozi still needed to be constructed, which was now a porterage route that strains the
local population at the time. He gave his opinion on how the construction could be
done,  under  whose  supervision,  but  never  even considered  that  it  may not  be  the
government’s responsibility to construct this private road to begin with. 
28 The  Commissaire  de  District of  the  district  Bas-Congo,  M.  Morel,  agreed  with  the
recruitment conditions for the road, but stipulated that the local workforce should be
paid by Cooreman. The manner in which the indigenous workforce would be recruited
was not discussed in any of these letters, signalling that, although aware of the labour
shortage, Cooreman’s offer was seen as an optimal solution to keep the local workforce
from migrating away from the territory. The focus was on the economic aspect of the
cultivation,  assuming that  if  more work was introduced in  the  area,  the  automatic
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response of the local population would be to stop migrating. The Commissaire Général,
interim of the Provincial Governor of Congo-Kasaï, later sent this entire compilation of
letters to the Gouverneur Général, narrowing down the request to the question if or if not
the  government  should  allow Cooreman extra  privileges.  However,  the  Commissaire
Général claimed that no help should be offered to the firm at all as long as the trial was
incomplete. No longer treating the road question as an independent request, he acted
according  to  his  own  motives  of  not  wanting  his  province  to  pay  for  the  road’s
construction, nor wanting to strain the local population, and gave a negative reply to
the request. 
29 Various reasons can be discerned for this outcome. First of all, the construction of the
railroad from Matadi to Léopoldville was, at that time, one of the biggest projects on
the agenda of the Governor, as the completion of these infrastructure works would
mean that  the entire  province of  Bas-Congo could attract  new investors.  Take into
account the (international)  struggles concerning forced labour,  the Governor would
have been pressured to finish the railroad’s construction as soon as possible. Although
he  was  undoubtedly  aware  of  the  migration  problems  the  lower  government
representatives discussed, the railroad’s construction was the priority of his agenda.
Any additional recruitment in the area, it being for advancement of the roads or for
new cultivation practices, would further add to the recruitment problems the railroad
already struggled with. By delaying the request until the results of the trial area were
complete, he hoped to finish the railroad construction first, which was foreseen to be
only six months later. In the end, the Gouverneur Général agreed with him, and sent a
letter to the Minister of Colonies, in which he quoted that this was not an appropriate
time to give extra concessions to Cooreman & Co (July 25, 1930). 
30 On August 7, an ambiguous decision was taken by the Minister of Colonies: he gave his
principle agreement to Cooreman & Co. for both the protection zone as well as the
funding  of  the  road  construction,  after  the  negative  advice  the  Gouverneur  Général
provided. This decision seemed very contradictory, as Jaspar first demanded the local
authorities’  expertise,  when  he  did  not  follow  their  advice  later.  Further  research
revealed  that  just  the  day  before,  he  received  positive  recommendations  from  the
Brussels-based colonial Departments of Agriculture and Economy to grant the demand
of Cooreman & Co. in order to stimulate extra investment in the area. However, the
Gouverneur  Général of  the  Léopoldville-based  government  did  not  agree  with  these
recommendations,  having  given  a  negative  advice  just  ten  days  earlier.  Several
explanations  can  be  given  for  this  difference  of  opinion.  In  general,  we  can  ask
ourselves if the Brussels-based Departments of Agriculture and Economy were aware of
the  depth  of  the  population  problems  the  Province  of  Bas-Congo  struggled  with.
Nonetheless, the Department of Public Transportation, based in Brussels and a direct
collaborator of the two former departments, was undoubtedly aware of the problems
the railroad construction encountered. So both the Gouverneur Général and the Minister
of Colonies should have been informed of these issues, making the latter’s priority of
keeping the Belgian entrepreneurs  happy and stimulating extra  investments  in  the
colony even more telling.
31 The road was ultimately completed in August 1931, entirely paid by the government
and constructed by the indigenous population, even though the Minister of Colonies
himself literally quoted in the beginning of the discussion : ‘Il est évident que si la route
Luozi-Luala présente un caractère d’utilité publique, le Gouvernement peut envisager
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les moyens d’y faire des travaux ; par contre si elle n’a pour but direct que les intérêts
privés de la firme susmentionnée, c’est à cette dernière qu’il appartient d’en supporter
la charge’13. Not only should the road, which was the first in the territory of Cataractes-
Nord,  officially  be categorised as  a  private road (which means government funding
should be out of the question), if it were to be a public road, its ‘general interest’ is not
proven at all, as the road does not connect provincial capitals, urban areas, or major
cities.  However, as discussed above, road infrastructure was considered an essential
part  of  the armature économique and the colonial  government in Belgium wanted to
encourage all means of constructing transportation infrastructure in the region. Even
if,  at  the  time  of  its  construction,  the  road  officially  only  connected  the  new jute
exploitation  site  to  the  river,  therefore  mainly  serving  the  interests  of  Victor
Cooreman, construction this road network of course aided the state’s presence in this
previously inaccessible region (Fontainas, 1921).
 
Conclusion
32 This  article  analyses  how  the  Belgian  colonial  government  conceived  road
infrastructure a tool of empire, and how its genesis is completely different from the well-
studied railroad network. Examining the case of Victor Cooreman demonstrates how
the colonial state stimulated road construction projects in the previously inaccessible
Cataractes-Nord  region,  as  this  new  road  network  could  help  facilitate  the  state
presence and surveillance in the colonial hinterland. Even if the road between M’bedi
and Luozi at its origins only served the private interests of Victor Cooreman, making it
easier for him to extract his jute from the colony, the road is ambiguously granted the
status  of  ‘general  interest’.  The  colonial  government  authorised  thus  that  the
surrounding African population was obliged to construct and maintain this road, even
if the abolishment of forced labour in the colonies was a rising topic in international
debate at the time. This article therefore underscores the hypothesis that the colonial
road network was linked to the infiltration and development of the colonial hinterland,
and its construction and maintenance was all the more disruptive for local populations.
33 Although  this  article  choses  to  focus  on  the  relation  between  the  government
machinery and private entrepreneurship,  the study of the development of the road
network in the Cataractes-Nord region introduces a wider set of actors active in public
road construction: missionary congregations, private investors, African labourers… and
shows how the specific dynamic between them influenced the decision-making process
of the road construction project ‘on the ground’. The next step would be to investigate
the  impact  of  missionary  congregations  on the  colonial  road infrastructure  project
(Cleys et al.,  2019; Cleys, De Meulder, 2011; Mahaniah, 1981). A detailed cartographic
study  of  the  evolution  of  the  missionary,  state,  and  privately  constructed  road
networks after 1931 would offer valuable insights in both the geopolitical and economic
motives  of  all  actors  involved.  Additionally,  this  cartographic  mapping  should  be
completed by consulting the colonial archives in the capital of DRC and the archives of
local missionary congregations, most of them still present in the DRC. 
34 Still, the evolution of interwar road construction in the Cataractes-Nord region clearly
illustrates  how  relative  these  roads  as  tools  of  empire were:  in  the  hands  of  smart
investors they become ‘tools’ to make a profit in a colony; in the hands of Africans
‘tools’ to avoid colonial power (Mathys, 2014); and even in the hands of different layers
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of the colonial administration they served different purposes. Headrick’s tools of empire
concept  may  be  applicable  to  Belgian  Congo’s  road  construction,  it  is  also  super-
reducing. It conceals the complexity that occurs when introducing a ‘technology’ in a
colonial  context,  where  various  local  officials  and  private  entrepreneurs  have  the
agency to adapt these centrally-defined road policies in the ‘on the ground’ reality in
the vast Congolese rural hinterland. This case provides thus already a powerful lens
through  which  we  can  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  forces  at  play  in  the
transformation  the  road  network  brought  about  in  the  understudied  Congolese
countryside. 
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ABSTRACTS
Contrary to the well-recognised relation between railroad infrastructure and emerging cities in
the Belgian colony, the development of the Congolese road network was more closely connected
to  accessing  the  colonial  hinterland  and  the  expanding  the  rural economy.  This  latter  link
remains underresearched in both Congo’s and Africa’s transportation history, even if the colonial
government equally considered road infrastructure a tool of empire. This article deconstructs this
super-reducing concept of  tools  of  empire in search of  a better understanding of  the complex
reality  of  how  centrally-defined  road  policies  landed  ‘on  the  ground’  in  the  vast  Congolese
hinterland.  Studying  the  interwar  development  of  the  road  network  in  the  Cataractes-Nord
region  demonstrates  how everyday  colonial  policymaking  relied  deeply  on  the  aptitude  and
agency  of  private  entrepreneurs  and  government  officials  alike,  in  a  first  step  to  truly
understand the forces at play in the opening up of the Congolese countryside.
Contrairement à la relation bien reconnue entre le développement de l’infrastructure ferroviaire
et les villes émergentes de la colonie belge, le développement du réseau routier congolais était
plus étroitement lié à l’accès à l’arrière-pays colonial et à l’expansion de l’économie rurale. Ce
dernier  lien reste trop peu investigué dans l’histoire  des transports  au Congo et  en Afrique,
même si  le  gouvernement colonial  considérait  également l’infrastructure routière comme un
« tool of empire » (« outil d'Empire »). Cet article déconstruit ce concept réducteur de « tool of
empire » en cherchant à mieux comprendre la réalité complexe de la façon dont les politiques
routières  du  niveau  central  ont  été  transposées  sur  le  terrain  dans  l’arrière-pays  congolais.
L’étude du développement du réseau routier pendant l’entre-deux-guerres dans la région des
Cataractes-Nord montre comment l’élaboration quotidienne des politiques routières coloniales
reposait considérablement sur l’aptitude et la capacité d’action des entrepreneurs privés et des
fonctionnaires du gouvernement, dans un premier temps pour comprendre les forces en jeu dans
l’ouverture de la campagne congolaise.
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